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magine a small group of people, each of whom borrows money from a ﬁ-
nancial intermediary. The intermediary does not require collateral because
the borrowers are relatively poor and do not own much property. Instead,
the intermediary requires group members to be jointly liable for each other’s
loans. That is, if a member defaults on a loan, the rest of the group is liable
for the remainder of the loan. If the group does not honor this joint obligation,
then the entire group is cut off from future access to credit.
The lending arrangement I just described is not ﬁctitious. Two million
villagers, most of whom are female and poor, borrowed in this way from the
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. In Bolivia, 75,000 urban entrepreneurs, roughly
one-third of the banking system clientele, borrowed money via group loans
from BancoSol. Even in nineteenth-century Ireland, many rural residents took
out loans similar to group loans.
Motivated in part by group lenders in less-developed countries, organiza-
tions in the United States have developed similar programs. The 1996 Directory
of U.S. Microenterprise Programs lists 51 organizations that issue group loans.
The programs operate in both rural and urban areas. Often they are run by
nonproﬁt organizations.
The underlying idea of group lending is to delegate monitoring and enforce-
ment activities to borrowers themselves. Borrowers who know a lot about each
other, such as those who live in close proximity or socialize in the same circles,
are the most promising candidates for group lending. For example, the rural
villages that Grameen lends in would seem ideally suited for group lending,
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because they are relatively self-contained communities, and people live close
to each other and interact regularly. In such an environment, residents should
be better than outsiders at assessing and monitoring the creditworthiness of
fellow residents. They should also be better able to apply social pressure on
potential defaulters.
The ﬁrst goal of this paper is to analyze group lending, particularly as a
potential method for lending to the poor in the United States. Studying alter-
natives to traditional lending is important because there is economic evidence
that the poor in the United States have an unmet demand for ﬁnance. Zeldes
(1989) ﬁnds that the poor are borrowing-constrained; that is, they would like
to borrow more money at existing rates than they can. Evans and Jovanovic
(1989), even after accounting for possible correlation between entrepreneurial
ability and wealth, ﬁnd that the lack of wealth affected the poor’s ability to
engage in self-employment activities. Bond and Townsend (1996), reporting on
the results of a survey of ﬁnancial activity in a low-income, primarily Mexican
neighborhood in Chicago, ﬁnd that bank loans are not an important source of
ﬁnance for business start-ups. In their sample, only 11.5 percent of business
owners ﬁnanced their start-up with a bank loan. Furthermore, 50 percent of the
respondents ﬁnanced their start-up entirely out of their own funds.
Two services provided by ﬁnancial intermediaries are delegated monitor-
ing and asset transformation. Banks provide both of these services and, maybe
surprisingly, groups do too. Group members monitor each other and through
joint liability, transform the state-contingent returns of its members’ loans into
a security with a different state-contingent payoff. Consequently, groups can
be interpreted as ﬁnancial intermediaries, albeit small ones.
Interpreting groups as ﬁnancial intermediaries is an important part of my
second goal: to place group lending in the context of the rest of the ﬁnancial
intermediation sector. In this paper, groups have a comparative advantage at
some types of ﬁnancial intermediation. Understanding comparative advantage
and specialization in ﬁnancial intermediation to the poor is important because
it can help answer questions such as: Which ﬁnancial intermediary is best at
what activity? How are different intermediaries ﬁnancially linked? Do legal
and regulatory restrictions, through their effect on the organization of ﬁnancial
intermediation sector, change the services they offer? These are the questions
that underly the assessment of legislative acts aimed towards lending to the
poor, like the Community Development Financial Institutions Act (CDFIA)
and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).1
1 The two acts take different views on the importance of the structure of the ﬁnancial in-
termediation sector for lending to the poor. The recently enacted CDFIA seems to take the view
that alternatives to traditional ﬁnancial institutions are needed to provide ﬁnancial services to
low-income communities. (See Townsend [1994] for a critical discussion of the act.) It funds
institutions that specialize in providing ﬁnancial services to low-income communities. In contrast,    
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Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework I use is the delegated monitoring model developed
in Diamond (1984, 1996). In his work, there are lots of small lenders and a
smaller number of borrowers. Lenders lend to borrowers through a ﬁnancial
intermediary in order to economize on monitoring costs.
My model makes two additions to this framework; the major one is to
allow some borrowers to monitor each other at a lower cost than outsiders.
The heterogeneity in monitoring costs drives the coexistence of two types of
ﬁnancial intermediaries, large ones like banks and smaller ones like groups.
Both types transform assets and provide monitoring services. In my model,
just like in Diamond’s model, lenders’ funds ﬂow through a large ﬁnancial in-
termediary. But in my model, the large ﬁnancial intermediary does not directly
lend to all borrowers. Instead, for those borrowers who can monitor each other
at a low cost, it lends to groups that in turn lend to their members.
I use Diamond’s framework for three reasons. First, delegated monitoring
is an important feature of group lending. Second, it allows for the embedding
of groups into the ﬁnancial intermediation sector. Finally, it demonstrates the
similarities between groups and other ﬁnancial intermediaries.
There is a small economic literature on group lending. This literature ex-
amines group versus individual lending but not in a model designed to study
the existence of ﬁnancial intermediaries. Stiglitz (1990) examines a problem
where group members can assess whether other members are shirking. Varian
(1990) examines the important screening role groups may provide, that is, their
use of their prior knowledge about others to form groups. He also examines
learning from fellow members as a potential advantage of groups. Besley and
Coate (1995) examine the potential enforcement advantages groups may have.
For example, social ostracism of defaulters is an option available to groups
but not to outsiders. These penalties can reduce incentives to default but not
in all cases. Sometimes, they increase the chance of default. While all of these
features of group lending are important, I abstract from them.
In the following section, I provide background on group lending in practice,
after which my model is developed and analyzed. Then I analyze the portability
of group lending to the United States in the context of the model.
the CRA seems based on the premise that lending to low-income people is best done by existing
ﬁnancial institutions but that these institutions underserve low-income communities because of
neglect, or even discrimination in the most egregious cases. The CRA works by requiring regula-
tors to evaluate banks on criteria such as ﬁnancial services provided to low-income communities.
Banks that score poorly are subject to sanctions such as limits on merger activities.        
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1. GROUP LENDING IN PRACTICE
Microﬁnance is the provision of ﬁnancial services to the poor. The preﬁx micro
is used because the amounts involved in transactions are small. Often, microﬁ-
nance is provided by nonproﬁt organizations; their targets are people who have
not participated in the formal ﬁnancial sector. The ﬁnancial services that their
clients do use tend to be supplied by relatives, or in some parts of the world, by
moneylenders. Formal ﬁnancial institutions have avoided this market because
the loan sizes are small, administrative costs per dollar lent are high, and they
perceive the risk of default to be signiﬁcant. It is the absence of the formal
sector from these markets that has led nonproﬁt organizations, often with the
goal of poverty alleviation instead of proﬁt maximization, to supply ﬁnancial
services. It is also the inappropriateness of traditional ﬁnancial products that
has led to the introduction of ﬁnancial products such as group lending.
Group lending is not the only tool used to provide microﬁnance. Many
microﬁnance organizations make loans only to individuals while others make
loans to both individuals and groups. Others provide savings and insurance ser-
vices. Much microﬁnance is provided informally, by rotating savings and credit
associations, or between friends and family. While these issues are important,
I do not discuss them because this paper is a study of the narrower question
of what conditions favor group lending.
Group Lending in Less-Developed Countries
The most famous group lender is the Grameen Bank, which was founded in
Bangladesh in the mid-1970s. This bank makes loans to groups of ﬁve unre-
lated individuals who are poor. Most groups consist of landless women from
the same village. Loans are made sequentially with remaining members not re-
ceiving their loans until other members repay their loans. Loan size is increased
after the group has successfully repaid earlier small loans.2
The bank has grown tremendously. In 1992, it lent to 2 million people at
real interest rates of around 12 to 16 percent. Their repayment rate is high,
around 97 to 98 percent. The bank even shows a proﬁt, though it would not do
so without the low-interest loans and grants it has received (Morduch 1997).
The Grameen Bank is far from the only institution to make group loans.
Even in Bangladesh, there are at least two other organizations, Bangladesh
Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Thana Resource Development
and Employment Programme (TRDEP), that make group loans (Montgomery,
2 There are several other interesting features of the bank’s organization. For example, collec-
tions of six groups are formed into Centres. All payments are made at Centre meetings in public
view of other Centre members. Savings funds are also developed to provide for contingencies
like death or disability. See Rashid and Townsend (1993) and Fuglesang and Chandler (1987) for
more details.     
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Bhattacharya, and Hulme 1996). Like Grameen, BRAC is a sizable institution,
lending to over 600,000 borrowers in 1992. Other countries with lending insti-
tutions that make group loans include Kenya (Mutua 1994), Malawi (Buckley
1996), Costa Rica (Wenner 1995), Columbia, and Peru, just to name a few.
One of the most successful group lenders is BancoSol, located in Bolivia.
It is a chartered bank, subject to the supervision of SIB, the Bolivian bank reg-
ulatory agency. It makes uncollateralized loans for periods of 12 to 24 weeks.
Repayments are made frequently, every week or two. Loans are made to what
they call solidarity groups, each of which can have four to ten members. The
group takes a loan from the bank and apportions it among its members. Like
Grameen’s groups, group members are jointly liable for each other’s debts.
Loans are usually made to provide working capital for small-scale commercial
activities. Also like Grameen, the majority (77 percent) of clients are women.
But unlike the Bangladesh bank, most of the borrowers are located in urban
areas. Nonetheless, borrowers still have good information about each other
because BancoSol requires all members of a solidarity group to work within a
few blocks of each other. Most borrowers are market vendors, though half of
the portfolio is lent to small-scale producers like shoemakers, bakers, and tailors
(Glosser 1994). Lending is not the only ﬁnancial service provided by BancoSol.
It also offers deposit services in both boliviano and U.S. dollar-denominated
accounts.3
BancoSol’s growth has been extraordinary. In 1996, it lent to about 75,000
people, roughly one-third of the people who use the Bolivian banking sector.
In 1996, BancoSol had a loan portfolio of $47.5 million. It also earned $1.1
million on revenues of $13 million (Friedland 1997). Two important reasons
for this success is that the bank charges real interest rates of 34 percent and
has a default rate of less than 1 percent (Agafonoff 1994). The high interest
rates are no doubt required to cover the high administrative costs required by
its lending strategy. As a basis of comparison, 80 percent of BancoSol’s costs
are administrative, while the comparable number for the rest of the Bolivian
banking industry is only 20 percent (Glosser 1994).
3 BancoSol is a chartered bank because Bolivian law requires deposit-taking institutions to
be chartered banks subject to governmental supervision. BancoSol was created by PRODEM, a
nonproﬁt organization that specialized in making loans. Its operations were ﬁnanced mainly by
grants, usually from foundations and USAID. The organization felt that grants were an insufﬁcient
source of capital, so it decided to create a regulated bank in order to have the legal right to collect
deposits. Interestingly, the bank’s nontraditional activities complicated the granting of the charter.
For example, existing Bolivian banking law required that uncollateralized credit be less than twice
paid-up capital. Unfortunately, for BancoSol, uncollateralized credit is all they supply! The bank
negotiated a compromise in which loans under $2,000 do not count towards this total. The costs
of the conversion were not trivial. They exceeded $500,000, according to one estimate (Glosser
1994).       
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Group Lending in the United States
Recently, several lenders have tried group lending in the United States. These
lenders are nonproﬁt organizations whose main goal is to assist the poor—in
particular, women and minorities—by ﬁnancing self-employment. Since these
efforts have started relatively recently, published information is still limited.
One source of information is a study by Edgcomb, Klein, and Clark (1996),
who examine seven microenterprise programs. Of the seven, four make group
loans.4 Each program provides services other than group lending. Several lend
to individuals, others provide training, and some provide all three services.
All four programs followed Grameen’s example but with modiﬁcations.
Each agency started with groups of ﬁve members. However, the agencies found
that if an individual dropped out of the group, the rest of the group would
disband. Currently, three of the agencies allow more ﬂexibility in group size.
One program allows four to ten members, while another allows four to six
businesses per group.
The scale of the agencies’ operations are still small. For example, the
number of loans made by the programs in 1994 ranged from 27 to 103, and
average loan sizes ranged from about $2,100 to $4,900. Making these loans
is expensive. The average cost per loan varied from $4,500 to $15,300, so
these programs are far from self-sufﬁcient. However, when compared with job
training and other assistance programs, their costs seem more reasonable. I
discuss possible reasons for the high costs after I describe the model.
Historical Group Lending
Group lending is often considered a recent innovation, and its recent popular-
ity certainly is connected with the success of the Grameen Bank. There are,
however, at least two types of institutions that existed long before the Grameen
Bank and that used variants on group lending.
To the best of the author’s knowledge the earliest institutions that used
a form of group lending were the Irish Loan Funds (Hollis and Sweetman
1997a, b).5 The funds developed in the early 1700s, peaked in size in the early
1800s, and then slowly declined throughout the rest of the nineteenth century.
Interestingly, Hollis and Sweetman trace their development to Jonathan Swift,
the Anglican priest best known for writing Gulliver’s Travels.
4 The four that made group loans were the Coalition for Women’s Economic Development
(CWED), based in Los Angeles; the Good Faith Fund (GFF), located in Pine Bluff, Arkansas;
the Rural Economic Development Center (REDC), which lends throughout North Carolina; and
the Women’s Self-Employment Project (WSEP), based in Chicago.
5 All reported information about the Irish Loan Funds is taken from Hollis and Sweetman
(1997a, b).       
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The Irish Loan Funds were usually located in rural areas, took deposits,
and made small loans. The institutions generally made uncollateralized loans
to ﬁnance a small investment project, such as the purchase of an animal. As a
rule, the loans were repaid on a weekly basis. These loans most resembled
present-day group loans in that all borrowers were required to obtain two
cosigners for each loan, and both cosigners were liable for repayment.6 While
each fund was independent, the funds were regulated by a Central Loan Fund
Board.
Another historical example of European group lenders was that of the
German credit cooperatives that developed in the late nineteenth century
(Guinnane 1993; Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane 1994). They were often lo-
cated in rural areas where individuals knew each other well. These cooperatives
provided credit services, and importantly, many had a policy of unlimited li-
ability. That is, if the cooperative failed, any member could be sued for the
entire amount owed by the cooperative. Interestingly, these credit cooperatives
were the inspiration for the credit union movement in the United States.
2. THE MODEL
The model in this paper is designed to study the following three features of
group lending and the ﬁnancial intermediation sector:
² the existence of joint liability groups
² the existence of more traditional ﬁnancial intermediaries
² large ﬁnancial intermediaries lending to the groups
Analysis of these issues requires a model in which it is possible to lend funds
either directly to an individual or indirectly through a ﬁnancial intermediary.
With two additions, the framework in Diamond (1984, 1996) provides an en-
vironment that satisﬁes these conditions.
Diamond considered an economy where there are borrowers and lenders,
and funding each borrower’s project requires the resources of several lenders.
Borrowers’ returns are unobserved by a lender unless he spends resources to
monitor the borrower. Lenders face the choice of whether to lend directly to
borrowers or to lend to them indirectly through the ﬁnancial intermediary. In
equilibrium, lenders lend to the ﬁnancial intermediary and the intermediary in
turn lends to the borrowers. The reason that lenders lend through the ﬁnancial
intermediary is that it avoids costly duplicative monitoring.
This paper operates in the same framework but with two additions, het-
erogeneous monitoring costs and screening costs. The important addition is the
former. In particular, some borrowers are given the ability to form small groups,
6 The loans are much like the ones Swift made. Using his own money, he made small
uncollateralized loans, required cosigners on loans, and required frequent repayments.       
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and in these groups they can monitor their fellow members. This ability is
potentially valuable because group members monitor each other at a lower cost
than a more traditional ﬁnancial intermediary. People who live close to each
other, those who work near each other, or those who socialize together would
be most likely to satisfy these conditions. As in Diamond’s model, it is optimal
for lenders to lend to a traditional ﬁnancial intermediary, but in this paper the
ﬁnancial intermediary lends to groups that in turn lend to their members. As we
will see, the incentive problem underlying the contract between lenders and the
large ﬁnancial intermediary is the same as the incentive problem underlying the
contract between the large ﬁnancial intermediary and the groups. It is in this
sense that groups and institutions, such as banks, are ﬁnancial intermediaries
for the same reason.
Environment
The model in this section is really a numerical example that closely follows
Diamond (1996). In this economy, there are two main types of people, lenders
and borrowers. Both types are risk-neutral, and consumption cannot go below
zero. Each lender is endowed with 1/m, m > 1, units of the investment good.
The investment good cannot be consumed, but it can be used to create the
consumption good. Lenders have access to a safe but low-return investment
technology. Their investment technology takes x units of the investment good
and turns it into 1.05x units of the good, receiving an interest rate of 5 percent.
The borrowers are better at producing the consumption good, but they start
without any units of the investment good. Each borrower’s investment technol-
ogy requires an input of exactly 1.0 unit of the investment good. An investment
of less than 1.0 produces an output of zero and any investment over 1.0 unit is
wasted. The former assumption means that for each borrower it takes the funds
of at least m lenders to ﬁnance his investment. Their investment technology
is also riskier than that of lenders. In this example, an investment of 1.0 unit
produces an output of 1.0 with a probability of 0.2 and an output of 1.4 with a
probability of 0.8. Expected output for a borrower is (0.2)1.0+(0.8)1.4 = 1.32,
which is greater than 1.05, the return on the safe investment. However, 20 per-
cent of the time output is less than what it would have been if the lender’s
investment technology had been used. Finally, I assume that each borrower’s
return is independent of other borrowers’ returns.
In this model, the owners and the productive users of the investment good
are different people. As the problem presently stands, the initial mismatch
between owners and users is easily rectiﬁed through simple loan contracts.
Lenders would lend to borrowers as long as their expected repayment was
equal to 1.05. There is no role for intermediaries.
To introduce intermediaries requires the addition of complications to writ-
ing and enforcing contracts, complications that intermediaries are better able     
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to overcome than lenders. I now describe four features to the model that affect
the feasibility and desirability of various contracts and ultimately lead to a
role for ﬁnancial intermediaries, both large ones like banks and smaller ones
like groups. The four features are private information on borrowers’ returns,
liquidation costs, costly monitoring, and costly screening.
Private Information
It is assumed that borrowers’ returns are private information. That is, a borrower
is the only person who knows the success of his project; lenders do not observe
it, nor do other borrowers. Private information makes some contracts infeasible.
For example, consider a contract where lenders receive 1.0 if the low output
is produced and 1.0625 if the high output is produced. If lenders knew that
the contractual terms would be honored by the borrower, they would make
the loan because their expected return is 0.2(1.0) + 0.8(1.0625) = 1.05. Under
private information, however, they cannot be sure that this contract would be
honored. The reason is that lenders do not know the true value of the output
so the borrower could always claim that he received a low output. That is, if
the lender received the high output the borrower could claim he received the
low output, pay 1.0 to the lender, and keep the difference. Lenders would be
powerless to stop this deception; they cannot ﬁnd out if he is telling the truth,
and as things are presently speciﬁed, they cannot punish him. All they can do
is refuse to lend, despite the acknowledged quality of his project.
Liquidation Costs
A contract with the option of liquidation is one way out of this dilemma. In this
model, a liquidation cost serves as an ex post penalty imposed by the lender
on the borrower. If the borrower does not meet the terms of his agreement, the
lender can liquidate the borrower’s assets. In this model, I interpret liquidating
as meaning that the borrower and the lender receive zero. This means, among
other things, that there are no assets that the lender can seize and sell. (In
microﬁnance, projects are so small that one would gain very little from seizing
and selling physical assets.)
The penalty imposed on the borrower by liquidation is important because
it prevents him from always claiming he received the low output, as in the con-
tract described above. For example, consider a debt contract with a face value
F of 1.3125. If the borrower does not repay 1.3125, he has defaulted. When the
output is 1.4, the borrower pays 1.3125. When the output is 1.0, the borrower
cannot pay the full amount, so the lender liquidates, giving the borrower (and
the lender) zero. The expected return to the lender is (0.8)(1.3125) = 1.05, so
the loan is made and the borrower receives zero in the low-return state and
0.0875 in the high-return state. The threat of liquidation is enough to force
repayment in the high-return state. The cost of liquidation is that output, which            
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is 0.2 in expected value terms, is destroyed. But in this example, the beneﬁts
of ﬁnancing the loan outweigh the liquidation costs.7
Costly Monitoring
Costly monitoring is the other way to make lending feasible. In this paper
there are two types of monitoring: costly monitoring by a lender and mutual
monitoring within a group. Monitoring by a lender is identical to monitoring in
Diamond’s model; the lender pays an ex ante cost that allows him to observe a
borrower’s output. In essence, the lender uses resources to observe the private
information. The resource costs could be as simple as spending time with the
borrower or as complex as receiving regular reports on the project’s ﬁnancial
status.
Observing output is valuable because then repayment can be made depen-
dent on output, which avoids the need for liquidation. For example, consider
the following contract: the lender monitors and the borrower pays 1.0 if the low
output is realized, and 1.2 if the high output is realized. The expected return
for the lender is 0.2+0.96¡K, where K is the cost of monitoring. If the cost of
monitoring is K · 0.11, then a lender’s expected return (assume for the moment
there is only one lender) is greater than 1.05, making monitoring worthwhile.
Furthermore, this contract with monitoring is better for the borrower than the
liquidation contract. (In both cases the borrower keeps zero in the low state,
but under the monitoring contract, he keeps more in the high state.)
The second type of monitoring, mutual monitoring within a group, is the
main departure from Diamond’s model. I assume that within a subset of bor-
rowers there are pairs of borrowers who know each other well, maybe because
they live near each other or maybe because they are in the same social or
ethnic circles.8 Each one of these pairs may form a group at a per-person cost
of Kg. Membership in a group allows a group member to observe the other
group member’s output. Furthermore, because of the close social ties within a
group, or maybe even because their time is less valuable than a loan ofﬁcer’s,
I assume that the cost of being in a group is lower than the cost of anyone else
monitoring them, that is, Kg < K.
At this point I should say more about what it means to be a group and how
that affects the group’s interaction with nongroup members. I am assuming that
group members observe each other’s outputs and act cooperatively or collude.
In many models where people can collude, their interaction is complicated
7 There is no advantage from a contract that liquidates for the high output but not for the
low output. Under such a contract, the borrower would always claim the low output, avoiding
liquidation and keeping the difference between the high-output and the low-output payment. More
generally, if the technology allows for more than two realizations of the output, even a continuum,
then the optimal contract will still be a debt contract. The optimal contract will require a constant
payment and liquidation if that payment is not made.
8 For simplicity, I assume that groups consist of only two people.         
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and even disadvantageous.9 In this model, there are no such disadvantageous
effects. Furthermore, the analysis is simple because the borrowers are risk-
neutral and thus utility is transferable. In this model, transferable utility eases
the analysis because it means that the division of output between the group
members does not affect the group’s decisions. That is, regardless of how the
group shares their returns, the group acts as if it is maximizing total expected
output. In this paper, I assume that they share the returns equally. Besley and
Coate (1995) examine a group-lending arrangement where there is an element
of strategic play between group members, and they show that this can be a
problem in some cases. I abstract from this consideration.
Screening Costs
The last element, and the remaining addition to Diamond’s setup, is the addition
of a screening cost. What I have in mind is a preliminary form of monitoring.
A lender needs to meet with the borrower, discuss his project, and record and
verify information about the borrower. In contrast with the previously discussed
monitoring costs, screening costs do not reveal the ﬁnal output. They only rep-
resent the effort that goes into ensuring that the project has a chance of success.
To model these ideas, I assume that there is a ﬁxed cost of Ks per lender to
screen a borrower. I do not model what happens if the lender or lenders do not
screen a borrower; I simply assume that they must screen a borrower before
they make a loan.
I also assume that screening is only necessary for lending to borrowers.
By borrowers I mean the second type of people, those who have access to the
high return and risky technology, and not any entity that receives funds for
investment. In particular, there is no need to screen a ﬁnancial intermediary,
though the ﬁnancial intermediary still needs to screen any borrowers to whom
it lends. This assumption is admittedly strong but not without merit. It seems
reasonable to assume that it is harder to do a preliminary evaluation on small,
idiosyncratic investment projects than on a large, well-known institution such
as a bank. The only role of this assumption is to ensure that lending to groups
is done by the ﬁnancial intermediary and not directly by lenders.10
Where I am going...
In this economy there are lenders who have funds and borrowers who do
not. The productivity of borrowers’ investment projects creates a demand for
9 See, for example, Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1990), Itoh (1993), Ramakrishnan and Thakor
(1991), or Prescott and Townsend (1996).
10 There are other ways to ensure that lending to groups goes through the large ﬁnancial
intermediary, though they add additional issues that complicate the analysis. For example, making
lenders risk-averse would be sufﬁcient, since then each lender would want to lend directly to more
than one group. Consequently, each lender would screen several groups, raising screening costs.        
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ﬁnance. Private information, however, precludes lending unless there is mon-
itoring or the penalty of liquidation. Before describing how these elements
create a demand for ﬁnancial intermediation, it is helpful to show what the
lending ﬂows will be and where each type of ﬁnancial intermediary ﬁts into
the ﬂow pattern.
Figure 1 describes the direction of lending ﬂows in the model. Arrows
indicate the direction of lending and an M indicates whether or not there is
monitoring. The lenders, who start with the investment good, make unmonitored
loans to the large ﬁnancial intermediary.11 This ﬁnancial intermediary makes
two types of loans, monitored loans to individuals and unmonitored loans to
groups. Groups, the smaller ﬁnancial intermediary, in turn make monitored
loans to its members.
My strategy for analyzing the model is to split the analysis into two sec-
tions. In the ﬁrst section, I take as given that there is one large ﬁnancial
intermediary and analyze its decision of whether to make a loan to an in-
dividual or to a group. To do this analysis, I consider each type of loan the
ﬁnancial intermediary may make to the borrowers and enumerate the trade-offs
of lending to a group versus lending to individuals and also whether or not it
is beneﬁcial to monitor the loans. Next, I consider the lending decisions for
lenders and show that it is indeed optimal for them to lend to borrowers through
the ﬁnancial intermediary rather than to lend to them directly.
Lending by the Financial Intermediary
The large ﬁnancial intermediary has three options for lending funds:
² It can lend to borrowers, not monitor them, and use the threat of
liquidation;
² It can lend to borrowers and monitor them; or
² It can lend to borrowers through groups.
For this last case, we need only concern ourselves with unmonitored loans
to the groups, since if the bank monitored them, it might as well bypass the
groups altogether.
Recall that for each borrower who invests 1.0 unit of capital, he produces
the low output of 1.0 with a probability of 0.2 and the high output of 1.4 with
a probability of 0.8. Also, borrowers need 1.0 unit of the good to invest and
for reasons explained later, the large intermediary requires an expected return
of 1.05.
The expected returns to a project can be broken into ﬁve components: the
expected payment to the ﬁnancial intermediary R, the expected utility (return)
11 There can be more than one large ﬁnancial intermediary as long as each one has a sufﬁ-
ciently large portfolio. For our purposes, it is simplest to assume there is only one.       
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Notes: M indicates that the loan is monitored. Arrows indicate direction of lending ﬂows.
of the borrower U, the liquidation costs L, the monitoring costs M, and the
screening costs S. These will sum to 1.32, the project’s expected output. In the
following sections, when each contract is analyzed, I will list the values of the
ﬁve components for each contract. Also, I assume that the ﬁnancial intermediary
receives 1.05, the opportunity cost of the lenders’ funds. Thus, any excess ac-
crues to the borrower. Under this (unimportant) assumption, maximizing social
welfare is equivalent to maximizing the utility to the borrower.
Individual Lending with Liquidation but No Monitoring
The enforcement device used for this contract is liquidation. Since there is no
monitoring, a state-contingent contract without liquidation cannot be offered.
Instead, a debt contract with a face value of F is written. Under this contract
the borrower must pay F, or his project is liquidated. To make the problem
interesting I assume that the parameters are such that 1.0 < F < 1.4. This
means that if the borrower receives the high return he pays F, but if he receives          
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the lower return, his project is liquidated, and both he and the intermediary
receive zero. An F guaranteeing that the intermediary receives 1.05 in expected
return is the solution to the following equation:
1.05 = (0.2)0 + (0.8)F ¡ Ks.
The intermediary receives a zero payment 20 percent of the time, it receives a
payment of F 80 percent of the time, and this return has to be high enough to
cover the screening costs Ks and the opportunity cost of the funds 1.05. The
solution to the equation is F = 1.3125 + Ks/(0.8). The borrower’s expected
utility is U = (0.2)0 + (0.8)(1.4 ¡ F). Calculations for utility and the other
variables of interest are as follows:
U = 0.07 ¡ Ks,
R = 1.05,
L = 0.20,
M = 0, and
S = Ks.
Notice that these values sum to 1.32, the project’s expected return.
Individual Lending with Monitoring
There is no need to liquidate when monitoring because output is observed by
the ﬁnancial intermediary. For simplicity, I assume that 1.0 is paid out if the
low return occurs, and F is paid out if the high return occurs. A face value
of debt F that gives the intermediary a return of 1.05 is the solution to the
following equation:
1.05 = (0.2)(1.0) + (0.8)F ¡ K ¡ Ks.
Compared with the previous contract, the intermediary now receives 1.0 if the
low output is observed but must also bear the monitoring cost K. The solution
to this equation is F = 1.0625+(K+Ks)/(0.8). The borrower’s expected utility
is again U = (0.2)0 + (0.8)(1.4 ¡ F). Carrying out the calculations for the
variables produces the following numbers:
U = 0.27 ¡ K ¡ Ks,
R = 1.05,
L = 0,
M = K, and
S = Ks.
Comparing the utilities from a loan with monitoring and a loan using liquida-
tion shows that the former is preferred when 0.27 ¡ K ¡ Ks > 0.07 ¡ Ks,o r
equivalently, K < 0.20.        
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Group Lending
The group-lending contract includes elements of monitoring and liquidation.
The group members monitor each other, but since the large ﬁnancial inter-
mediary does not know the results of their monitoring, it needs to include a
liquidation provision in the contract. As I mentioned earlier, the two members





The assumptions made concerning group membership are that group mem-
bers observe each other’s output and act cooperatively. In this context, acting
cooperatively means they maximize the expected value of the group’s return.
Thus, the contract needs to be written in terms of the total returns to the group,
since the group can always move funds around to pay off a debt. Therefore, the
optimal contract will again be a debt contract, with liquidation if the face value
of the debt is not repaid. To facilitate comparison with the other contracts, we
put the face value of the debt in per-group-member terms, that is, the face value
of the group’s debt is 2F.
For the intermediary to receive an expected payment of 2.10 (1.05 per
group member), F needs to solve the following equation:
2.10 = (0.04)0 + (0.32)(2F) + (0.64)(2F) ¡ 2Ks.
I assume that the large intermediary rather than the group bears the screening
cost. This assumption is not important.
At this point, it is necessary to make one more assumption. I assume that
2.4 units of output is enough to pay off the face value of the group’s debt, 2F.
The value of 2F will depend on the other parameters, so I am assuming their
values are such that this condition holds. Under these assumptions, the solution
to the equation is F = 1.09375 + Ks/(0.96). Each borrower’s utility, assuming
equal division of returns, is calculated from U = (0.04)0 + (0.32)(2.4 ¡ 2F ¡
2Kg)/2+(0.64)(2.8¡2F¡2Kg)/2. I include the monitoring cost in this equation
because the group pays it themselves. The values of the variables in per-group-
member terms are
U = 0.23 ¡ (0.96)Kg ¡ Ks,
R = 1.05,
L = 0.04,
M = (0.96)Kg, and
S = Ks.         
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Special attention should be paid to the liquidation cost, L. Under group
lending, L = 0.04, which is dramatically lower than the case where the inter-
mediary lends but does not monitor. (Recall that the liquidation cost in that
case was 0.20.) The reason for the dramatic reduction is that the distribution of
the group’s output is different from the distribution of the individual’s output.
In particular, the group’s distribution has less variance. The decreased dis-
persion of group returns reduces the incentive problem caused by the private
information. In turn, a weakened incentive problem means that liquidation is
invoked less often than a liquidation contract between the intermediary and an
individual.
The argument is easier to understand if we compare two borrowers borrow-
ing F each as a group with the same borrowers borrowing F each as individuals
under the unmonitored liquidation contract. Also, assume that 1.0 < F < 1.2.
When the funds are lent to the individuals, each borrower’s project is liqui-
dated 20 percent of the time. This means that 4 percent of the time both are
liquidated, 32 percent of the time one is liquidated, and 64 percent of the
time neither is liquidated. Now compare these liquidation probabilities with
those of the group. Under the group contract, 4 percent of the time both are
liquidated, but 96 percent of the time neither is liquidated. The reason is that if
one borrower gets a bad return and the other gets a good return, then the latter
bails out the former. The transfers between the group members, in effect, alter
their distribution of returns. This change reduces the probability of liquidation,
which is beneﬁcial.
One more way to view this problem, and an argument I will return to
when discussing the large intermediary, is to consider a group consisting of
a very large number of borrowers. (More formally, assume there is a contin-
uum of them.) Because there are so many group members, the law of large
numbers means that the group’s total return is 1.32 ¡ Kg with probability
1.0. All idiosyncratic risk averages out. In this case, there is never a need
to liquidate since any claim that total output was less than 1.32 ¡ Kg would
not be credible.
To reiterate, groups greatly reduce the probability of being liquidated.
Still, they have to pay a monitoring cost, and the relative size of these two
costs (along with the intermediary’s monitoring cost) determine whether group
lending is better than the other types of lending. In this example, group
monitoring is better than individual lending with monitoring if 0.23¡(0.96)Kg¡
Ks > 0.27 ¡ K ¡ Ks; that is, the utility accruing to a borrower from group
monitoring is greater than the utility accruing to a borrower from an individual
lending with monitoring contract. Rearranging terms, the condition is
(0.96)Kg + 0.04 < K. (1)
Equation (1) says that group monitoring is better if the sum of the group mon-
itoring cost Kg and the liquidation cost of 0.04 is less than the intermediaries           
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monitoring cost K. This is not strictly true because Kg is multiplied by 0.96.
That number, however, is only in the equation because groups bear the cost of
monitoring; if their projects are liquidated, they receive zero and do not have
to bear the monitoring cost.
I can now provide conditions under which the large ﬁnancial intermediary
will lend according to the pattern described by Figure 1. First, I assume that
monitoring by the intermediary satisﬁes K < 0.20 (so individual lending with
monitoring is better than individual lending without monitoring). Second, I
assume that for some pairs of borrowers Kg is small enough to satisfy equation
(1) and for other pairs of borrowers it is not. The former borrowers could
be those who live near each other like Grameen’s clients or work near each
other like BancoSol’s clients. For parameter values satisfying these conditions,
borrowers who cannot form a group borrow as individuals with a monitored
loan, while other borrowers who can form a group do so and borrow from the
intermediary as a group, using the liquidation contract.
Lending to the Large Financial Intermediary
Now return to the lenders’ lending decision. In equilibrium, as indicated by
Figure 1, lenders lend to the large ﬁnancial intermediary rather than directly to
individuals or groups. Most of the pieces are already in place to demonstrate
why this is the case. Lenders can either transform the asset themselves by using
the low return but riskless technology, or they can choose one of the following
four lending options:
² Lend directly to borrowers and use a liquidation contract;
² Lend directly to borrowers and monitor them;
² Lend directly to the group and use a liquidation contract; or
² Lend to the large ﬁnancial intermediary.
The last option, lending to the large ﬁnancial intermediary, is the optimal
arrangement. I will demonstrate this by ﬁrst showing that the costs to lenders
of lending directly is greater than the same costs faced by the large ﬁnancial
intermediary making the same loans. Then, I will show that the lenders can
lend to the large ﬁnancial intermediary at no cost. This will mean that lending
through the large ﬁnancial intermediary is better than direct lending. Finally, if
the large intermediary receives a return of 1.05, as was assumed in the previous
analysis, and the intermediary adds no costs to lending, then it is optimal for
lenders to lend to the large intermediary.12
The ﬁrst three cases listed above are the direct-lending options available
to lenders. Each one of these options corresponds to one of the cases worked
12 Technically, lenders are indifferent between this option and using the safe investment
technology. Among these two choices, I assume that the lenders choose the socially optimal one,
which is to lend to the large ﬁnancial intermediary.      
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through earlier in the section. The difference is that now monitoring and screen-
ing costs have to be borne by m > 1 lenders rather than just the large ﬁnancial
intermediary. The algebra is easy enough to work through but it is simpler
to use the following observations. The incentives faced by a borrower do not
depend on whether his funds are obtained from lenders or via the large ﬁnancial
intermediary. Consequently, the problem is unchanged from the earlier analysis
except that screening costs (in all three cases) and monitoring costs (in the
second case) are m > 1 times as much under direct lending. Therefore, it is
cheaper for lenders to lend through the large ﬁnancial intermediary rather than
directly.
However, there still remains the issue of whether or not lenders need to
monitor and screen the ﬁnancial intermediary. If they do not, they can lend
to the intermediary, which in turn lends to borrowers (either directly or indi-
rectly through groups). This ﬂow of funds will economize on monitoring and
screening costs relative to direct lending.
By assumption, there is no need to screen the intermediary. However, some
work is needed to demonstrate that lenders do not need to monitor the large
ﬁnancial intermediary. How do lenders know that the intermediary actually
monitors the borrowers? How do they know the return of the intermediary?
(At this point, it is helpful to think of the large intermediary as a person,
possibly a lender, who if he did not monitor would save himself monitoring
costs.)
In the previous section’s analysis of lending to the group, the increased
size of the group made the liquidation contract more effective. The larger the
group, the more effective a liquidation contract was. If the group consisted of a
continuum of members, then there was no need to monitor because the group’s
return is certain.
The same logic applies to the problem facing the lenders lending to the
intermediary. If the intermediary lends to a continuum of borrowers, then the
intermediary’s return is certain. Thus, the optimal contract between lenders and
the large ﬁnancial intermediary is an unmonitored debt contract of face value
F = 1.05. As part of the debt contract, the lenders liquidate the intermediary’s
assets if it claims its return is less than 1.05. But in equilibrium, the inter-
mediary’s portfolio is so diversiﬁed that its assets are never liquidated. Thus,
there is no liquidation cost to lending through the ﬁnancial intermediary, and
there is no need to monitor it. The entire return of 1.05 that the intermediary
receives from borrowers can be passed to the lenders. Lending through the
large ﬁnancial intermediary is better than direct lending.
To summarize, the large ﬁnancial intermediary economizes on monitoring
and screening costs while the groups economize only on monitoring costs. Rel-
ative to direct lending, both types of intermediaries economize on monitoring
costs in the same way. Lending through the intermediaries avoids the duplica-
tive monitoring of borrowers by lenders while the intermediary’s diversiﬁcation       
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reduces the need for lenders to monitor it. Thus, total monitoring is lowered
in the economy. The reduction of these costs is the ﬁnancial intermediary’s
special role in transforming assets.
There is, however, one way in which the two types of intermediaries differ
in how they economize on monitoring costs. Compared with monitoring by the
large ﬁnancial intermediary, the groups save on monitoring costs because they
have a cost advantage. It is efﬁcient for the large ﬁnancial intermediary to lend
through groups if this cost saving outweighs the liquidation cost from using
the group. The remaining observation—that lenders lend to groups through the
large ﬁnancial intermediary—occurs to economize on screening costs.13
3. ANALYSIS
Ideally, the model would be used in the following way. We would start with
measurements of parameters in the model, such as distribution of returns, costs
of monitoring, etc. These measurements would come from economies, like
villages in Bangladesh or urban areas in Bolivia, where group lending is suc-
cessfully used. Using these measurements we would evaluate the model on the
criterion of whether or not it predicts there will be groups. If it does predict
groups, the experiment proceeds by solving the model using parameter values
taken from low-income U.S. communities. Then, the model could be used to
evaluate the potential of group lending in the United States.
Precise measurement of many of these values is beyond the scope of this
paper. Indeed, measurement of a concept like monitoring is a research project
in and of itself. Consequently, the following discussion is necessarily sketchy,
guided by what little information is available. Still, it is valuable, and one can
gain some broad ideas about the role group lending and ﬁnancial structure may
play in channeling credit to the poor. The discussion should be considered a
starting point, particularly for researchers and practitioners who are looking for
guidance as to what variables to measure.
Business Opportunities
The model analyzes the problem of ﬁnancing investment projects. It takes
as given that potentially proﬁtable investment projects exist. The ﬁnancing
13 One difference from the Diamond (1984, 1996) setup is worth mentioning. In his paper,
ﬁnancial intermediaries exist only to economize on monitoring costs. In this paper, the large ﬁ-
nancial intermediary economizes on monitoring costs, but it also economizes on screening costs.
The latter costs, in fact, are sufﬁcient in this model for the large intermediary to exist. In this
paper, monitoring costs serve the role of obtaining a nontrivial trade-off between individual and
group lending. They are necessary to generate the existence of the small ﬁnancial intermediaries,
that is, the groups.   
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problem, however, is irrelevant if there are no proﬁtable microenterprise
projects to ﬁnance.
The evidence presented in the introduction suggests that there are proﬁtable
investment projects in the United States that would be ﬁnanced in the absence
of information constraints. There are, however, reasons to think that there may
be less of these opportunities in the United States than in Bangladesh or Bo-
livia. For example, in less-developed countries 60 to 80 percent of the labor
force is engaged in self-employment (Edgcomb, Klein, and Clark 1996), while
in the United States only about 12 percent of the labor force is self-employed
(Segal 1995). Ultimately, of course, the existence of proﬁtable self-employment
opportunities must be determined by empirical investigation.
A related issue, applicable to most microﬁnance programs, is what type
of investments can be ﬁnanced with group lending or any other microﬁnance
program. For example, one key feature of the studied lending programs is the
required frequency of repayments. Frequent repayment requires that an invest-
ment produce cash ﬂow for the entire course of the loan. If it does not, then
the borrower will default. This time path would seem to preclude loans for
investments that pay off sometime in the future. For example, a planting loan
to a farmer is poorly suited for frequent repayment because planting does not
generate income until harvest.
A cursory examination of the type of loans made by Grameen, BancoSol,
or the Irish Loan Funds bears out this observation. Despite their rural location,
planting loans are not made by Grameen nor were they frequently made by
the Irish Loan Funds. Many loans tend to be for investments that produce a
ﬂow of income. The purchases of a cow that produces milk or a chicken that
lays eggs are examples of such an investment. BancoSol’s loans, while in a
different context, serve a similar purpose. They tend to be made for working
capital.
Conceivably, there are many valuable investments that do not produce the
steady cash ﬂow demanded by group and other microﬁnance lending schemes.
The important question here is why are the loans made with these terms? Are
frequent repayments an important part of monitoring? The answers to these
questions are important not just to the evaluation of group lending in the United
States but also for the evaluation of lending in less-developed countries.
Source of Funding and Comparative Advantage in Lending
The source of funding is important because it can limit the activities of a ﬁ-
nancial intermediary, and it can inﬂuence the optimal structure of the ﬁnancial
intermediation structure. In the model, there were many lenders per borrower.
This ratio was responsible for the existence of the large ﬁnancial intermediary
since the number of lenders needed to ﬁnance a borrower determines the costs
of direct lending, and consequently the savings in monitoring and screening       
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costs from intermediation. For microﬁnance programs it is reasonable to ask if
there are lots of lenders per borrower. First, the loans are for small amounts,
and second, many lenders are donors with large amounts to lend.
BancoSol receives some of its funding from deposits. Agafonoff (1994)
reports that in 1994 BancoSol’s average loan was $499 and its average deposit
was $225. (The majority of the bank’s loans and deposits are denominated
in U.S. dollars rather than Bolivian bolivianos.) These numbers are consistent
with the model’s assumption.
Still, many investors are large organizations whose investments are much
higher than the amount any single individual borrows. In terms of the model
some modiﬁcations would need to be made to ensure that donors lend through
an intermediary rather than directly. The simplest, and most obvious, would
be to assume that donors do not have the expertise to lend themselves. Conse-
quently, K and Ks are much higher if they lend themselves rather than through
an intermediary. Another possibility is that donors, particularly those overseas,
ﬁnd it expensive to monitor because of physical, linguistic, and even cultural
distance from the borrowers. (See Boyd and Smith [1992] for a model in which
people at different locations have a comparative advantage in lending in their
home location.)
A comparison of the United States and Bolivia suggests that a group lender
may desire different sources of funds in the two countries. In Bolivia, BancoSol
raises some of its funds from deposits, but it is a country where a large fraction
of the population does not use the banking sector. The banking sector, and more
generally the ﬁnancial structure, is much more extensive in the United States.
Consequently, raising deposits might not be a group lender’s comparative ad-
vantage. Instead, debt or equity might be a better source of capital for a group
lender in the United States.
In the United States, group lenders’ comparative advantage should be in
lending rather than in collecting deposits. Lending to the poor likely requires
a different set of skills than other types of lending. BancoSol’s high adminis-
trative costs relative to the rest of the Bolivian banking sector is supportive of
the latter conjecture.14
Indeed, it is not difﬁcult to imagine a highly specialized ﬁnancial system
where traditional ﬁnancial intermediaries collect deposits and then direct funds
to specialists in microﬁnance, who in turn lend to groups (or individuals).
There is no reason to think that traditional ﬁnancial intermediaries are the best
institutional vehicles for delivering credit to the poor.
14 In the model, groups save on monitoring costs, yet in the data, group lenders spend a lot
of resources on monitoring. This is not a contradiction. The issue is how much more resources
would have to be used to monitor in the absence of groups. That is what the model captures.          
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Costs to the Large Intermediary
In the model, for some parameter values the large intermediary saved costs
relative to direct lending. In practice, monitoring and screening costs may be so
high as to make any form of ﬁnancing unproﬁtable. The problem is particularly
acute for microﬁnance because loans are for small amounts, and they require
frequent repayments. In the context of the model’s parameters, K and Ks might
be much higher in the United States than in less-developed countries.
The data bears out the importance of these costs. Eighty percent of Ban-
coSol’s costs are administrative while the cost ﬁgures for the U.S. agencies
exceed the face value of the loans. BancoSol has surmounted these problems
through a combination of a low default rate and a high interest rate (about 34
percent per year). In 1994, their average cost per dollar lent was 0.16; their
borrower-to-loan-ofﬁcer ratio was about 320.
Any microﬁnance program in the United States that desires to even ap-
proach self-sufﬁciency will need a similar strategy and results. None of the
four agencies have reached BancoSol’s scale. No agency made more than 107
loans in 1994. Their loan-loss ratios vary from about 2 to 17 percent, and their
costs per dollar lent uniformly exceed one. These programs are far from self-
sufﬁcient. Of course, these programs are relatively new and any activity takes
time to learn, not to mention the time needed to obtain economies of scale.
It would be interesting to compare these agencies’ default rates with those of
Grameen or BancoSol in their early years of operation.15
Still, self-sufﬁciency may be too strong an evaluative criterion. Many ser-
vices and transfers are distributed through the social welfare system and these
programs are the right basis for comparison. Under this interpretation, microﬁ-
nance is unusual in that it directs aid to speciﬁc people in the population; those
who are willing to start businesses. Furthermore, unlike most social welfare
programs, the recipients face the explicit incentive to perform or lose their aid.
Under this criterion, group lending may very well be an effective method for
targeting aid to the poor, particularly since these agencies’ costs are comparable
with those of job-training programs.
Monitoring within Groups
One of the most critical issues concerning group lending is how high is Kg,
the cost of group monitoring?16 There are reasons to think that Kg is higher in
15 A potential problem for any program with the goal of self-sufﬁciency is that the interest
rates necessary to cover costs may be illegal, violating usury laws in many states of the union.
16 In the model, monitoring was an either–or proposition. The only options available were to
pay the monitoring costs and observe fellow members’ output or to not pay the cost and not see
the output. In practice, there are degrees of monitoring. Still, for the purposes of our discussion,
Kg provides a useful way to summarize these degrees.        
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the United States than in developing countries. There is more anonymity, the
costs of being excluded from a group are smaller in a rich country, and people
do not necessarily work in such close quarters.
Edgcomb, Klein, and Clark (1996) provide some indirect evidence in sup-
port of this view. They conclude that the group-lending programs have had
the most trouble in rural areas. The programs found that rural residents do not
tend to know each other well enough to be able to support groups, in part
because of the low density of the population and in part because of the low
number of self-employed people in rural areas. One agency has even resorted
to purchasing credit reports on fellow members for potential groups.
Another complication is that self-employment opportunities are more di-
verse in the United States than in less-developed countries (Edgcomb, Klein,
and Clark 1996).17 Group members engaged in similar activities can learn from
each other and can evaluate the borrowing proposals of fellow group members.
It probably also makes monitoring easier. This is another reason Kg may be
higher in the United States. Some of the resources used on training by the U.S.
programs may be designed to compensate for this.
4. CONCLUSION
Lending groups are ﬁnancial intermediaries, albeit small ones. The model shows
how groups, as well as larger ﬁnancial intermediaries, economize on monitor-
ing costs and transform assets. Through diversiﬁcation, ﬁnancial intermediaries
alleviate incentive problems and reduce the costs of monitoring and screening.
Throughout the paper, I provide extensive description of existing group-
lending programs to demonstrate that group lending is a type of intermediation
that is viable in at least several environments, including some of older origin
than many probably realized. Whether it is viable in the United States is an
open question, though the conditions here appear to be less favorable for it
than in less-developed countries. Still, while the narrow focus of this paper is
on the relative merits of group lending, the broader goal is to study ﬁnancial
structure. Understanding ﬁnancial structure is a necessary prerequisite to the
proper formulation of policy involving ﬁnancial intermediation and low-income
communities.
17 However, different activities may have less-correlated returns. In my model, group lending
is more valuable when returns are less correlated.    
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